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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the approval of the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971, and the Joint Communique on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic relations of January I, 1979 between the 
United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of 
China (ROC) on Taiwan has suffered tremendous and consecutive 
setbacks in its diplomatic relations with other nations in the world. 1 
Currently, ROC maintains full diplomatic relations with 20 countries2 and 
the Holy See (Vatican City). With the increasing recognition ofPRC since 
the 1970s, about 50 state entities have ceased their fonnal diplomatic 
relations with ROC, including the recent case of Sao Tome and Principe 
in 2016. 
Embedded in such diplomatically harsh environment, ROC on 
Taiwan has established eight bilateral trade agreements with El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Singapore, and China 
(PRC). Among these eight nations, ROC does not maintain diplomatic 
relations with New Zeeland and Singapore, while holding a "special 
relations" with PRC under the famous "1992 Consensus."3 Establishing 
economic trade agreement with other states normally requires formal 
diplomatic relations with such states, and apparently, ROC manages to 
stand as an outlier in the international arena. To achieve this type of 
bilateral trade agreements, ROC has to employ the World Trade 
Organization nomenclature as the Separate Customs Territory ofTaiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, instead of its official name, the Republic of 
China. 
Besides bilateral trade agreements that ROC currently holds, ROC 
has also participated in several global and regional economic 
I. For details. please sec hllp://www.un.org/doeumcnts/ga/rcs/26/tJrcs26.htm (assessed at 
January I. 20 I 7) and hup://photos.slatc.gov/libr.trics/ait-taiwan/17 14 14/ait-pages/prc_e.pdf 
(assessed at January I. 2017). 
2. These countries arc Belize. Burkina Faso. Dominican Republic, El Salvador. 
Guatemala. Haiti. Honduras. Marshall Islands, Nauru. Nicaragua. J>aJau, Panama, Paraguay. 
Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Solomon Islands. and 
Swaziland. 
3. The 1992 Consensus refers to a semi-official meeting between ROC and PRC in 1992. 
An unofficial conclusion of the meeting is the recognition of the One China Principle by both 
sides. For an extensive discussion of the 1992 consensus. see Yu-Shan Wu. "Taiwan in 2001: 
Stalemated on All Fronts," Asian Swn:r. Vol. 42. No. I (January1Fcbruary 2002), pp. 29-38. 
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organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).4 In addition, ROC has shown a 
strong interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 
comprehensive trade agreement between 12 nations, including the United 
States. Nevertheless, the current President of the United States, Donald 
Trump, signed a presidential memorandum to withdraw from TPP. which 
shadows the potential feasibility ofTPP in the future and discourages ROC 
from engaging with the TPP.5 On the one hand, participation in 
international organizations, regardless the nature of the organizations, 
improves the international recognition of ROC on Taiwan, given the fact 
that ROC is only acknowledged by roughly 10% of the sovereign states in 
the world. On the other hand, participation in economic international 
organizations shows an active engagement in the current trend of 
globalization and hopes to facilitate further economic growth through 
trade and financial openness. In the case of ROC on Taiwan, similar to the 
ditliculties in establishing bilateral trade agreements, with the absence of 
formal diplomatic relations and the existing diplomatic pressure from PRC 
on these international organizations and their member nations, it is not 
only ditlicult but, to a certain degree, impossible for ROC to join these 
international organizations without the approval from PRC. 
Nonetheless, scholars have articulated the benefits of trade and 
financial liberalizations through bilateral and multi-lateral trade 
agreements and participations in economic international organizations.6 In 
4. ROC is represented by a ministerial-level oflicial as "Chinese Taipei" in APEC'. 
5. For the details regarding the United States' withdrawal ofTPP, sec "Withdrawal of the 
United States From the Trans- Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement.'' F'ederal 
Register (January 25'h. 2017 ). https://www.fcdcralregistcr.govldocumcnts/20 1710 I /25/2017-
0 1845/withdrawal-of-the-united-states-from-thc-trans-paci fie-partnership-negotiations-and-
agreement (assessed March 15'h, 2017). 
6. Sec David Dollar and Aart Kraay, "Growth is Good for the Poor," Journal ~~r Hcmwmic 
Groll'tlr. Vol. 7, No.3 (September 2002), pp. 195-225; David Dollar and Aart Kraay. "Tmde, 
Growth. and Poverty,"77re Economic Journal. Vol. 114. No. 493 (February 2004), pp. F22-F49; 
L. Alan Winters. "Trade Libcmlisation and Economic Perfonnancc: An Overview," Tire 
Economic .loumal, Vol. 114. No. 493 (February 2004), pp. F4-F21: L. Alan Winters. Neil 
McCulloch and Andrew McKay, "Trade Libcmlization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far," 
Jormral c~{ Economic l.item/111'1!, Vol. 42, No. I (March 2004), pp. 72-115(44); Francisco A lea hi 
and Antonio Ciccone, "Trade and Productivity,"71re Quarter(!' .loumal c~{Econonrics. Vol. 119, 
No.2 (May 2004), pp. 613-646; Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, 
"Docs Financial Liberalization Spur Growth'!" Journal of Finmrciall:'conomics, Vol. 77. No. I 
(July 2005). pp. 3-55: Romain Wacziarg and Karen 11om Welch, "Trade Libcruli.£atiun and 
Growth: New Evidence," 11re World Ba11k Eco11omic Re1•iew. Vol. 22, No.2 (June 2001!), pp. 
187-231; and Ariel Burstein and Javier Cravino. "Measured Aggregate Gains from International 
Tr.tdc," Amt•riclllr C:cmwmic .luumal: A/acrut•cmwmics, Vol. 7, No.2 (April 2015), pp. 181-
218(38). Some scholars also find little evidence of the relationship between economic 
libemlization and growth: sec Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik. "Trade Policy and 
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general, economists have found evidence supporting a positive correlation 
between trade and financial liberalization and economic growth through 
increasing productivity,' eliminating poverty gap, 8 and overall economic 
growth indicators.') That is, with increasing accretion on trade 
liberalization through various means, including bilateral, multi-lateral 
trade agreements and joining economic international organizations, 
citizens and their governments can expect a higher economic return and 
benefits. These trade agreements and organizational participations can 
effectively lower the trade barriers through minimizing tariffs, 
deregulations, or increasing quotas on certain goods, and through 
increasing accessibility for foreign investors and corporations, which 
create more employment opportunities and market competition in prices. 
As a sovereign state entity, which actively seeks international 
recognitions, ROC on Taiwan has to sustain endless threats and pressures 
from PRC under the "One China Policy," acknowledged and enforced by 
both PRC and the United States. PRC, as the winning camp of the Second 
Chinese Civil War between 1945 and 1950, after it "untied" with the 
Soviet Union mid Cold War (the 1950s and 1960s), became a viable 
alliance option for the United States to balance power against the Soviet 
Union. The rapid economic development of PRC after the Communist 
government decided to marketize its economy, the trend of globalization 
since late the 1970s, and the potential profits for foreign investors that can 
be generated through its consumer market and comparative advantages 
(e.g., low-wage labor), have incentivized other nations to establish 
stronger diplomatic ties with PRC. By creating stronger diplomatic ties, 
these nations unavoidably have to decrease or even cease their existing 
foreign relations with ROC on Taiwan. To date, PRC is the second largest 
Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence," NIJER Macmecmwmics 
Annual, Vol. IS (2000); Barry Eichengreen, "Capital Account Liberalization: What Do Cross-
Country Studies Tell Us'!" 71/e World Bank Economic Re1•iew, Vol 15, No. 3 (October 2001 ), 
pp. 341-365; Halit Yanikkaya, "Trade Openness and Economic Gro\\1h: A Cross-Country 
Empirical Investigation," Journal of Dendopmentl:'conomics, Vol. 72, No. I (October 2003), 
pp. 57-89; and Gwendolyn K. Hallsmith, "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases 
Trade'!" The American Economic Re1·iew, Vol. 94, No. I (March 2004), pp. IJ8-II4(17). pp. 
F22-F49. 
7. Francisco Alcali1 and Antonio Ciccone, "Trade and Productivity" and Ariel Burstein 
and Javier Cravino, "'Meusurcd Aggrcgutc Guins li01n lnh:umtiunal Trade." 
8. David Dollar and Aart Kraay, "Growth is Good for the Poor;" David Dollar and Aart 
Kraay, "Trade. Growth. and Poverty;" and L. Alan Winters, Neil McCulloch and Andrew 
McKay. "Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far." 
9. Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey. and Christian Lundblad, "Docs Financial 
Libcrali7.ation Spur Growth'!'"; Romain Wacziarg and Karen Hom Welch, "Trade l.ihcmli7.ation 
and Gro\\th: New Evidence:" and Ariel Burstein and Javier Cra\>ino, "Measured Aggregate 
Gains from International Tmdc." 
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economy and the second highest military spending state in the world, as 
well as one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council. Thus, its international influences are not negligible. 10 As a result, 
the territorial and sovereign dispute between PRC and ROC constrains 
ROC's capability in breaking through its diplomatic hardship in seeking 
international recognition and constructing formal diplomatic relations 
with other nations and international organizations. 
The United States, on the other hand, passed and signed the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) in 1979 after ceasing its diplomatic relations with 
ROC in 1978. TRA regulates the non-diplomatic relations between 
citizens of the United States and citizens of ROC on Taiwan and authorizes 
de facto diplomatic relations between the United States and ROC. Due to 
its geographical location the resulting strategic position, ROC on Taiwan 
has been recognized as one of the important partners with the United 
States. Therefore, the second point of the second article in section 2 states 
that TRA is the policy of the United States .. to declare that peace and 
stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of 
the United States, and arc matters of international concern.'' 11 Later in 
1982, to ensure peace and stability in this area, the United States agreed to 
the Six Assurances proposed by Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party of 
ROC at that time, which provide a stronger warranty to TRA. 12 As the 
Cold War ended in 1991, the United States resumed its hegemonic position 
in the world. However, the emerging power, PRC, has become the number 
I 0. According to the International Monetary Fund, China· s nominal gross domestic product 
(GDP) was 11.391.619 billion US dollars in 2016, and according to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, its military spending was 214,787 million current US dollars in 2015. 
II. See https://www.ait.org.tw/enltaiwan-rclations-act.html (assessed March 1''. 2017). 
12. The Six Assurances proposed in 1982 were: I. The United States would not set a date 
for termination of arms sales to Taiwan; 2. llte United States would not alter the terms of the 
Taiwan Relations Act; 3. The United States would not consult with China in advance before 
making decisions about United States arms sales to Taiwan: 4. The United States would not 
mediate between Taiwan and China; 5. The United States would not alter its position about the 
sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the 
Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China: and 
6.ll1e United States would not fonnally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Later in 
2016, several changes were made to the original Six Assurances and engrossed by both chambers 
of the Congress of the United States. The revised assurances were: I .... • • [ W)e did not agree 
to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan": 2 .... • • (W)c sec no mediation role for 
the United States" between Taiwan and the PRC; 3. ··• • •[N)or will we attempt to cxen pressure 
on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the l'RC"; 4 .... • • (T]here has been no change in our 
longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan"; 5. "We have no plans to seck" 
revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act; and 6. the August 17 Communique, "should not be read 
to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to 
Taiwan". For more detail, sec https://www.congrcss.govlbilllll4th-congress/housc-concurrcnt-
rcsolutionl88/text (assessed January I". 2017). 
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one potential challenger to its hegemonic status since the late 20' 11 century. 
Thus, it is of great interest that the United States maintain benign formal 
and informal diplomatic relations with ROC. Nevertheless, similar to 
many other nations, the United States also needs to consider and maintain 
its economic ties and interests with PRC, resulting in a diplomatic 
dilemma for the United States in handling the cross-strait relations 
between ROC and PRC. 
With the constant threat from PRC and the United States' diplomatic 
dilemma in its relations with ROC, ROC has struggled to tind a loophole 
to gain more diplomatic and economic opportunities with other nations 
and international organization. To address this puzzle, we develop a theory 
to assess the possibility of ROC establishing trade agreements with other 
nations while lacking formal diplomatic relations. 
The theory predicts that the likelihood of constructing a bilateral trade 
agreement with a state, which maintains balanced foreign relations with 
both PRC and the United States, is higher. In addition, the likelihood of 
establishing a bilateral trade agreement with the nation that aligns with the 
interest of PRC or the United States, when ROC's relations with PRC or 
the United States, is stronger, respectively, assuming that the PRC and the 
United States maintain the status quo. The theory also predicts that ROC 
may have more or less opportunities in developing bilateral trade 
agreements with other nations when foreign relations between PRC and 
the United States are worsened or strengthened, respectively, given the 
state that establishes the bilateral agreement with ROC is leaning neither 
to the United States nor China (e.g. maintains a balanced relations with 
these two nations). To participate in a multi-lateral trade agreement, an 
explicit or implicit approval from PRC or the United States must be given 
in unchanged foreign relations between PRC and the United States. When 
such relations are strengthened or worsened, the possibility for ROC to 
join in any form of multi-lateral trade agreements would be minimized. To 
examine our theory, we review two bilateral trade agreements, the 
Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP) 
and the Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kin men, and Matsu on Economic 
Cooperation (ANZTEC). 
This research consists of six sections. The tirst section introduces the 
framework, research question, theoretical predictions, and outlines of 
research. The second section includes an extensive review of the literature 
regarding the pros and cons of trade liberalization through bilateral or 
multi-lateral trade agreement. The third section provides the theoretical 
assessment of the feasibility for ROC to establish bilateral and multi-
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lateral trade agreements without formal diplomatic relations under the 
current US-China power struggle. The fourth section reviews ASTEP, as 
an example demonstrating how ROC achieved a bilateral trade agreement 
when both ROC and Singapore were leaning toward PRC. The fifth 
section reviews ANZTEC and demonstrates the emergence of a trade 
agreement between ROC and New Zealand when foreign relations 
between the United States and PRC were aggravated due to increasing 
trade deficit from China to the United States. The last section provides 
concluding remarks, future research orientations, and policy implications 
to the government of ROC. 
II. LITERATURE ON ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION 
A. Toward Globalization: A Stimulation to Economic Growth 
The concept of globali7.ation first appeared in English literature 
around 1960, as researchers started to study the shrinking constraints of 
geography and the process of global interconnectedness. 13 One of the most 
phenomenal changes is the growth of international trade. After the World 
War II, the world trade volume maintained exceptional growth rate, 
averaging 6% annually while the total merchandise exports in the 
beginning of the 2J'h century was more than 22 times the level of 1950. 14 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were 
founded and have been aiding in the socio-economic development of least 
developed countries (LDCs). The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the successor World Trade Organization (WTO) were created 
"to help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly and prcdictably." 15 In this trend, 
many countries adopted liberalized trade policies, removing trade barriers 
and stimulating export industries, which further facilitate the process of 
globalization. As a result, economic globalization has become "the most 
powerful force to have shaped the post-war world." 16 
The burgeoning global socio-economic exchanges are not easy 
achievements. Although the idea of free trade, based on the concept of 
comparative advantages. can be traced back to Adam Smith during the 20'h 
Century, most developing countries embraced protectionist views, 
devoting much effort to maintain import substitution strategies and limited 
13. Malcolm Waters. 1995. Globalization. New York: Routledge. 
14. The World Trade Organization (WTO). "WTO in Brief." https://www.wto.org. 
Accessed: 4/9/17. 
15. IBID. 
16. Jeffrey frankel. "What Do Economists Mc11n by Ulobalizatiun'? Implicaliuns for 
inflation and monetary policy." (2006) Academic Consultants Meeting, Organized by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC. September 28. 
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degree of openness. 17 It wasn't until the 1980s that economists who studied 
least developed countries began to shift their focus to development 
strategies based on principles of market-oriented reforms, including an 
essential clement of reduction of trade barriers and opening of 
international tradcY1 With the routine requirements from the World Bank, 
IMF, and many other multilateral institutions, trade openness becomes a 
core factor to structural adjustments in many places. The East Asian 
economies that experienced rapid economic growth are especially drawing 
attention to trade openness.''' Furthermore, the collapse ofthe Communist 
system in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s added more momentum to the 
economic and trade liberalization reforms. 
Empirical evidence shows that the global trade system to remove 
trade barriers significantly improves member countries' economic 
performances. There is a consensus on this issue.20 Under the trend, the 
multi-lateral trade regimes play an essential role. For example, Martinet 
al. 21 found that during the 1950-2000 period, Asian economies with 
GATTIWTO membership traded 380 percent more than they would have 
been outside of the GA TT/WTO system. Even for country pairs that 
include one non-member, the trade volume is found to be 30 percent more 
with each other than if both were non-members. The expansion of 
multilateral trade regimes advanced trade-driven globalization by 
lowering taritTand non-tariffbarriers and by inducing more Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) through trade and investment negotiations. 
B. Trade Liberalization 
There is a strong consensus amongst economists of the benefits of 
free trade over time.22 Most of the empirical analyses show a positive 
relationship between trade openness and economic growth, as it increases 
17. Sebastian Edwards. "Openness, Trade Liberalization and Gro\\1h in Developing 
Countries." Joumal of Economic Literature, (September 1993), pp. 1358-1393; Robert E. 
Baldwin, "Openness and gr0\\1h: What's the empirical relationship?." In Robert E. Baldwin and 
L. Alan Winters cds, Challenges to Globalization: Allll~l'Zing the economics. University of 
Chicago Press. 2004. 499-526. 
18. IBID. 
19. World Bank, 71/e Hast Asian Miracle: l!nmomic growth am/public policy. Washington 
DC : World llunk Group. 
20. Dan Fuller. and Doris Gcide-Stevenson. "Consensus Among Economists- An 
Update." The Jouma/ of Economic Education Vol. 45, Issue. 2 (20 14 ), pp. 131-146. 
21. Wtll, Kym Anderson, and Cong S. l'ham, "Eilccts ofUArJ/WTO uu Asia's Trade 
Performance", in Shiro Am1strong and Thanh Tri Vo eds, /11/anationa/ Instill/lions am/ 
Economic Del·dopment in Asia. London: Routledge (2010). 
22. Dan fuller and Doris Geidc-Stcvcnson. "Consensus Among Economists An Update." 
17u• .louma/ of Economic !:'ducal ion Vol. 45. Issue. 2 (2014), pp. 131-146. 
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productivity,23 eliminates poverty gap,24 and leads to positive effects on 
overall economic growth indicators.25 These researchers and international 
organizations all suggest the developing countries speed up the process of 
trade liberalization from the growth perspective. The process of 
liberalization includes various policy means, such as joining international 
economic organizations and establishing bilateral or multi-lateral trade 
agreements with other countries. These arrangements, including trade 
agreements and organizational participations, help the economies to 
remove the trade barriers by decreasing tariffs and deregulations, and 
through increasing availability to foreign direct investments that bring in 
more resources and business opportunities. However, opponents of trade 
liberalization exist26 because trade liberalization may have side eflccts, 
such as widening the socioeconomic gaps between different sectors, 
countries, and regionsY Considering the implementation of trade 
liberalization, scholars argue that it is necessary to combine several 
essential policies, e.g., encouragement of investments and promoting 
human capital accumulation, to achieve a long-lasting effect of 
liberalization on economic growth.28 
I. Trade Openness and Economic: Growth 
Economists find that growth can be generated not only by increasing 
aggregate levels of labor and capital but also by efficiently allocating 
resources from the less productive sectors to higher efficient sectors. Trade 
openness plays essential roles in this process. On the one hand, the 
outward-oriented economy makes it possible to use external resources, 
including the capital and technologies that accelerate technological 
23. Francisco Alcal;i and Antonio Ciccone, "Tr.tde and J>roductivity" and Ariel Burstein 
and Javier Cravino, "Measured Aggregate Gains from International Trade." 
24. David Dollar and Aart Kmay, "Growth is Good for the Poor;" David Dollar and Aart 
Kr.tay, "Tmdc, Growth, and Poverty;" and L. Alan Winters. Neil McCulloch and Andrew 
McKay, "Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far." 
25. Gecrt Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, "Docs Financial 
Liberalization Spur Growth?"; Romain Wacziarg and Karen Hom Welch. "Trade Libcmlization 
and Grov.1h: New Evidence;" and Ariel Burstein and Javier Cravino, "Measured Aggregate 
Gains from International Tr.tdc." 
26. For example, sec Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik, "Trade Policy and Economic 
Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence"; Barry Eiehcngreen, "Capital 
Account Liberalization: What Do Cross Country Studies Tell Us?"; and Gwendolyn K. 
Hallsmith, "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Tr.tdc'!". 
27. Adrian Wood. North-south trade, employment and inequality: Changing fortunes in a 
skill-driven world. Oxford: Clarendon(l994); Robert H.Frank and Philip J. Cook. "The Winner 
Takes-all Society. (1995). New York: Free Press; United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP),//uman De,·elopmt•nt Report ( 1999). New York: Oxford University Press. 
28. L. Alan Winters, "Trade Liberalisation and Economic Performance: An Overview." 
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advancements in developing economies. It also leads to exploitation of 
economies of scale and greater capacity utilization. Thus, trade openness 
contributes to growth in productivity and employment. 2'} 
On the other hand, trade liberalization results in resource re-
allocation according to principles of comparative advantage. In an 
economy, marginal factor productivities are not equal in different sectors. 
For example, the export and non-export sectors of the economy have 
various sizes and functions in each country. Openness leads to 
significantly higher marginal factor productivities in the export sector and 
inter-sectoral beneficial externalities generated by the export sector. 
Economic growth can be achieved by reallocation of existing resources 
from the less efficient non-export sector to the higher productivity export 
sector.30 Empirical studies find robust evidence of this argument, as trade 
openness is seen as an essential factor to explain different economic 
outcomes across regions. 
Early literature has found that promoting free trade is essential for 
economic development and there is a positive relationship between export-
led sectors and economic growth. One of the pioneering cross-national 
studies is from Little, Scitovsky, and Scoot. 31 They illustrate that the 
structure of protection, measured by Effective Rates of Protection (ERPs ), 
impedes the manufacturing value added process. By protecting domestic 
industries, there are fewer incentives for allocating resources to develop 
export-oriented industrialization from traditional sectors or the agriculture. 
Thus, they suggest developing countries greatly reduce the degree of trade 
protection and open up to international competition in order to achieve 
industrialization and economic growth. 
Balassa·12 generalizes the argument that export-orientation policies 
foster growth, especially in developing countries. Balassa finds that, had 
some rapid-growth countries adopted policies that equal to the mean of all 
of the cases without extra efforts to boost export, the GNP would have 
29. Bela Balassa, "Exports and Economic Growth: Further Evidence," .lmmm/ of 
/Jew!lopment Economics, Vol. 5 (June 197!!), pp. 11!1-1!9; Mieko Nishimizu and Sherman 
Robinson, "Trade Policies and l'roductivity Change in Scmiindustrializcd Countries," .Jormral 
~{ /Je1·efopmem Economics, Vol.l6 (September-October 191!4 l. pp.I77-206; David Dollar and 
Kenneth Sokoloff, "Patterns of Productivity Growth in South Korean Manufacturing Industries, 
1963-1979," .Journal of De1·elopmem Economics, Vol.33 (October 1990), pp. 309-27. 
30. Gershon Feder. "On exports and economic gro\\1h." .loumal of /Jewlopment 
Eco11omics 12.1-2 ( 1983 ): 59-73. Hadi Salehi Esfahani, "Exports, imports, and economic grow1h 
in semi-industrialized countries." .loumu/ of l>en•lopmelll Eco11omics, Vol. 35, Issue. I ( 1991 l. 
pp. 93-116. 
31. Ian M. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. Scott .. lndusi!J' and Trade ill Some 
/Jel'l!loping Cou11tries A Comparatil'i! Study ( 1970), Cambridge: Oxford University l'rcss. 
32. Bela Balassa. "Exports ;md Economic Grow1h: Further Evidence". 
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been decreased significantly. For example, Korean GNP would be down 
37%, Taiwan 25%, Chile 14%, and India 12% would decrease respectively 
if there were no export-oriented policies during the period 1966-1973. 
Kruegern uses time-series and cross-section data to confirm the 
previous findings on the relationship between GNP and exports, adding 
more cases of developing countries. She points out positive cases such as 
Turkey, the Philippines, Ivory Coast, Colombia, and Malaysia, where 
export promotion led to economic growth. While the negative cases 
include India, Argentina, and Egypt, where trade restrictions retard the 
growth of exports and thus harm the economy, she concludes that there is 
"little doubt about the link between export performance and growth rates." 
Sachs and Williamson34 examine Asian and Latin American cases 
and they conclude, "The more important differences seem to center on 
exchange rate management and the trade regime." The Asian economies 
often use the foreign borrowings to develop industries for tradable goods, 
especially export industries. In contrast, Latin American countries often 
use the fund to finance private sectors and did little on increasing export 
capacity. This is one of the key factors to explain why Asian countries 
achieved a higher level of economic growth led by export sectors, whereas 
the Latin American counterparts were more vulnerable to the external 
shocks in the 1980s. 
Dollar'5 measures trade liberalization by constructing an index of 
outward orientation consists of two indices (real exchange rate distortion 
index and real exchange rate variability). He finds that Asian countries 
have lower price levels and real exchange rate distortion than Latin 
American and African counterparts. These two indices reflect relatively 
modest tariff protection and incentives oriented to external markets. In a 
broad sample of 95 developing countries in the period 1976-85, the 
analysis shows that his outward orientation measure is highly correlated 
with per capita GOP growth. The per capita growth rate in the most open 
quartile of countries is 2.9%; the second quartile, 0.9%; the third quartile, 
-0.2%; and the most closed quartile, - 1.3%. 
33. Anne Krueger, "Trade Policy as an Input to Development." 
34. Jeffrey D. Sachs and John Williamson, "Extemal Debt and Macroeconomic 
Performance in Latin America and East Asia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 
( 191!5 ), pp. 523-64, quote on 525. 
35. David Dollar,. "Outward-oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow more 
Rapidly: evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985." Eco11omic Den!lopme111 a11d Cultural Challgt• 
Vol. 40,1ssue. 3 (1992), pp. 523-544. 
12 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Sachs and Warner ( 1995)36 also provide substantial evidence about 
the positive trade-growth relationships, as they show that developing 
economies with open trade policies have grown at 4.49 percent per year 
while the openly developed economies grow at 2.29 percent per year. On 
the other hand, developing and developed economies that adopt closed 
trade policies have grown at 0.69 and 0.74 percent per year respectively. 
In particular, those that employed aggressive import substitution policies 
suffered the most in the economic crisis during the 1980s and 90s, while 
export-led policies mitigate the downsides of crisis. 
2. Trade Openness: More Rece/11 Evidence 
Similar evidence on the advantages of trade liberalization is quite 
abundant. For example, Edwards,37 Frankel and Romer,38 and Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan, 39 all find that open trade regime is a key factor for 
economic growth and other economic indices, such as poverty reduction. 
However, criticisms do exist, such as the early works of Rodriguez and 
Rodrik.40 Rodrigucz41 argues that standard measures of trade policy arc 
not associated with growth. These criticisms are more about 
methodological issues, especially the measurement of trade openness and 
economic growth, as Rodriguez points out that the relationship between 
trade policy and growth may be significant but they are not simply linear 
and the data cannot reflect it. Therefore, recent evidence turns to multiple 
research methods to confirm the positive relationship between trade 
liberalization and growth, where scholars specifY the policies needed for 
economic growth. 
First, recent studies have similar and consistent findings that 
international trade is positively associated with economic growth and 
related economic performance indices. For example, Bruckner and 
36. Jeffrey D. Sachs. Andrew Warner. Anders Aslund, and Stanley Fischer. "Economic 
Rcfom1 and the Process of Global lntcgrdtion." /Jrooki11~s Papers 011 J:nmomic Actit·ily 1995.1 
(1995).pp.l-118. 
37. Sebastian Edwards. "Openness. Trade Liberalization and Gro\\1h in Developing 
Countries," Journal tJj'J:'conomic l.itemture." Vol. 31 ( 1993 ). pp. 135S-1393. 
38. Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer. "Docs Trade Cause Gro\\1h'!" American 
Economic Rel'iew. Vol. 89, No.3. ( 1999): pp. 379-399. 
39. Jagdish Bhagwati and Thirukodikaval Nilakanlll Srinivasan. "Tmde and Poverty in the 
Poor Countries." 111(' Americtm l:'conomic Ret•iell'. Vol. 92, Issue. 2. (2002). pp. I!!O-IS3. 
40. Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik (2001 ). Tmdc Policy and Economic Growth: A 
skeptic's guide to the cross-national evidence. In Ben S. Bcmanke and Kenneth Rogoff eds, 
NBER Macmecol/olllics Amma/2000. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
41. Francisco Rodriguez. "Openness and growth: what have we learned." (2006). DESA 
Working l'apcr No. 51. 
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Ledennan42 examine the African countries and found that a one percent 
increase in openness leads to 0.5% short-run economic growth and 0.8% 
long-run growth per year respectively. 
Besides the direct linkage of trade liberalization and economic 
growth, the literature shows that it can be linked to various aspects of 
economic perfonnances;n especially on poverty reduction. Dollar and 
Kaaraf4 find that trade and increase in growth rates help the "rapid 
globalizers," one-third of the developing countries, to experience rapid 
income growth and poverty reduction over the past two decades. The 
effect is significant in countries such as Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka 
in South Asia, as they increase trade volume and reduce the tariff and non-
tariff barriers. In contrast, the remaining two-thirds of the developing 
countries that Jack suflicient outward orientation perfonned badly in tenns 
of growth and poverty reduction. Berg and Krueger, 45 using various 
methods and data to overcome potential measurement issues, also show 
that trade policy can be beneficial to economic development and poverty 
reduction. Taken together, from a meta-analysis viewpoint, Lopez46 
examine the evidence in both micro and macro levels and he concludes 
that the empirical research shows that trade liberalization enhances 
productivity and economic growth, reducing poverty in economies across 
different regions. 
Second, more and more scholars illustrate the importance of 
complementary policies to trade that combine to enhance economic 
developments in the long run. Mendoza47 points out that the relationship 
between trade openness and economic growth is conditional on related 
economic policies such as investments and employments, as poor 
management or implementation of economic policies could hinder growth. 
Stone and Strutt (20 1 0)48 argue that infrastructure is a necessity of trade, 
as well as the productivity. Also, economic policies that link trading 
42. Markus Briickncr and Daniel Lederman. ··Trade Causes Growth in Sub-Sahamn 
Africa." ( 2012 ). 
43. Winters, L. Alan. "Trade Libcralisation and Economic perfonnanee: an overview." 11u! 
Economic Journal Vol. 114 Issue. 493 (2004), pp. F4-F21. 
44. David Dollar and Aart Kraay. "Trade, Growth, and Poverty.". 
45. Andrew Berg and Anne Krueger. 'Trade, Growth, and Poverty: a selective survey." 
I!HF Working Papers 2003.30 (2003), pp. 1-50. 
46. Ricardo Lopez. Trade and Growth: Reconciling the Macroeconomic and 
Microeconomic Evidence. Journal fJ(Economic Sun·e.1·s, Vol. 19, Issue 4. (2005), pp. 623-648. 
47. Ronald Mendoza. "Trade and Growth in the Post-2001!12009 Crisis World." World 
Economics Vol. II, lssue.4 (2009), pp.29-36. 
4R. Susan Stone and Anna Strutt. "Tmnsport Infrastructures and Trade Facilitation in the 
Greater Mekong Subregion." in Douglas H. Brooks and Susan F. Stone cds, Trade Facilitation 
and Regional Cooperation in Asia. New Hampton: Edward Elgar (2010), pp. 156-192. 
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sectors with other sectors of the economy are necessary for a country to 
carry out growth led by the export sector. Chang et al:''l illustrate that a 
higher investment in human capital is necessary for growth, as the 
availability of infrastructure is also a key factor to developing different 
sectors of economy. Vohra50 finds that some countries employ restrictive 
and regulatory policies for the labor market, which might counterbalance 
the beneficial effects of trade. Cuadros et aJ.5 1 ar!,rue that appropriate 
policies towards foreign direct investment must be considered because it 
is one of the essential driving forces for the trade-led developments, as we 
will show in the next section. These policies must work together to ensure 
that a country can be beneficial from trade openness. 
To conclude the relationship between trade liberalization and 
economic growth, Panagariya sums up that the empirical evidence and 
experience from the last fifty years both provides significant support to the 
case of free trade. 52 In particular, in the developing world, a majority of 
the mass economic growth cases occurred when the government adopts 
strategies to remove trade barriers. Taken together, although there are 
debates on the measurement issues and causality issues, the baseline is that 
the literature is certain that trade restriction is not a stimuli for economic 
growth53 and the trade openness has a positive relationship with economic 
growth, poverty reduction, and other indices for developments. This view 
seems to be widely accepted by policy makers worldwide. 
C. The Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment and Portfolio 
Investment 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) is defined as I 0% ownership or more of a foreign party 
49. Roberto Chang • Linda Kaltani. and Norman V. Loayza. "Openness can be good for 
growth: The role of policy complcmcntaritics." .loumal o_( lkn:lopme/11 Ecmwmics 90.1 (2009): 
33-49. 
SO. Rubina Vohra. "Export and economic growth: Further time series evidence from less-
developed countries." lntematimwl Admnces inl:"cmwmic Research Vol. 7. Issue. 3 (200 I ). pp. 
345-350. 
51. Ana Cuadros, Vicente Ons. and Maile Alguaeil. "Openness and growth: Re-examining 
foreign direct investment, trade and output linkages in Latin America." Joumal ofDewlopme/11 
Sllldies 40.4 (2004): 167-192. 
52. An·ind Panagariya. "Miracles and Debacles: In Defence of Trade Openness." World 
Economy. Vol. 27, IssueS (August 2004). pp. 1149-1171. 
53. Ignacio Fiestas, "'The Effects of Trade Liber.llization on Growth. Poverty and 
Inequality." C/L·ll:" Nolcltcknim N1104105 (2005); Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik. "Trade Policy 
and Economic Growth: A skeptic's guide to the cross-national evidence." 
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in a domestic corporation. Basu and Guariglia54 point out that the FDI 
flows across the world and is one of the most significant signs of world 
economy globalization over the past 20 years. In the era of globalization 
and trade liberalization, the volume of FDI has been growing even faster 
than the volume of international trade. For example, the aggregate level of 
FDI stock worldwide doubled during 1975 to 1995, substantially 
exceeding the growth of trade sectors. 55 FDI has been proved as one of the 
most important factor that leads to improvements for various economic 
performance such as economic growth, higher wages, total employment, 
and productivity, especially in the developing host economies. However, 
it also has side effects on rising income inequality between different 
sectors, or displacing domestic firms. Scholars also find some necessary 
conditions in the host country if one expects to observe the best economic 
outcome caused by FDI. 
In a nutshell, FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of 
technology and productivity, helping to accumulate human capital and 
contributing relatively more to economic growth than local investment in 
the host country. FDI also helps to create new job demand and hence 
increase employment. The effect is especially significant in developing 
countries. Borensztein et al.56 trace the FDI flows from industrialized 
countries to 69 developing countries for over the two decades starting from 
1970. The result is consistent with previous ones. Cuadros et al.57 use Latin 
American cases to show FDI is key for economic growth. Levine and 
Renelt58 parcel out various factors that may have an eftect on economic 
growth and they show a robust relationship between economic growth, 
FDI and human capital. In particular, share of investment in GOP, FDI, 
and the trade volume in GOP all have positive eflccts. De Gregorio59 
studies 12 Latin American countries and uses the panel data to show that 
tactor productivity growth Jed by investment is one of the main 
54. Parantap Basu and Alessandm Guariglia. "Foreign Direct Investment, Inequality, and 
Growth." Journal of Macroeconomics. Vol.29, Issue. 4 (2007), pp. 824-839. 
55. Ray Barrell and Nigel Pain. "Foreign Direct Investment. Technological Change. and 
Economic Growth within Europe." The Ecmwmic Joumal. Vol. I 07 ( 1997), pp. 1770-1786. 
56. Eduardo Borensztcin. Jose De Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee. "How Docs Foreign 
Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth'!" Joumal of lmernclfimwl Economics. Vol. 45, 
Issue I (1998), pp. 115-135. 
57. Ana Cuadros, Vicente Orts, and Maite Alguacil. "Openness and GroMh: Re-examining 
foreign direct investment, trade and output linkages in Latin America." Joumal l?f'!Jel't'lopnwllt 
Sllldies, Vol. 40, Issue. 4 (2004), pp. 167-192. 
58. Ross Levine and David Rench. "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-country Growth 
Regressions." 77u• American f:'Ctmomic Re1·iew Vol. 82. Issue. 4(Scptember 1992), pp. 942-963. 
59. Jose De Gregorio. "Economic Growth in Latin America." .loumal t?f /Jew/opme/11 
Economics. Vol.39, Issue. I, ( 1992 ), pp. 59-!14. 
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determinants of growth and FDJ is about three times more eflicient than 
domestic investment. Blomstrom et al.t.l1 also find a significant effect of 
FDI on economic growth in least developed countries (LDCs). Taken 
together, Wacziargc.1 argues that FDI is the principal route in which trade 
liberalization has been effective for economic performance. 
FDI contributes to economic development through several 
mechanisms. The channels include stock of human capital, transferring 
and diffusion of technology, and a higher degree of efficiency due to the 
combination of foreign advanced management skills with domestic labor 
and inputs. These mechanisms are highlighted by an Organization for 
Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) study of both OECD and 
developing countries.62 
First, foreign investors contribute to economic growth because they 
tend to be more productive than local firms are. An analysis of 282 pairs 
of foreign and domestic firms of similar size drawn from 80 manufacturing 
industries in Brazil concluded that foreign firms have a significantly 
higher ratio of value-added to output than domestic firms. 63 The FDI and 
newly established manufacturers are thus leading the economic growth. 
Second, FDI affect growth by generating productivity spillovers. FDI 
brings in a process of competitive interaction, as well as technological 
accumulation between foreign and domestic firms, which raises the overall 
productivity. Blomstrom and PerssonM and Kokko65 find evidence that 
FDI led to significant positive "spillover effects" on the level of labor 
productivity and growth of domestic productivity in Mexico. Besides the 
technology, FDI and foreign investors stimulate knowledge transfers in 
terms of labor training, skill acquisition, alternative management 
practices, and better organizational arrangements. These new methods of 
production further stimulate the competition between local firms and FDI-
60. Magnus Blomstrom .. Robert E. Lipsey, and Mario 7..cjan. What E'(p/ai11s De•·e/opill~ 
Coumry Groll'th?. No. w4132. National Bureau of Economic Research, (August 1992). 
61. Romain Wacziarg,. "Measuring the Dynamic Gains From Trade." 71w World lltmk 
Economic Re1•ielt' Vol. IS, lssue.3 (200 I). pp. 393-429. 
62. OECD ( 199)) Technology and Productivity: The Challenge for Economic Policy. 
J>aris. 
63. Larry N. Willmore, "The Cornp;1rativc Pcrfonnance of Foreign and Domestic Finns in 
Brazil." World /Jet•elopment. Vol. 14, Issue 4 (1986): 41!9-502. 
64. Magnus Blomstrom and Hakan J>crsson. ''Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency 
in an Underdeveloped Economy: evidence from the Mexican manufacturing industry." World 
J>ewlopmelll. Vol. II, Issue. 6 (1983), pp. 493-501. 
65. Ari Kokko. "Technology, Markel Characteristics, und Spillovers." Joumal t!{ 
/)el'elopmentl:conomics. Vol. 43. Issue. 2 ( 1994). pp. 279-293. 
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related sectors, prompting the existing actors to be more efficient to adapt 
to the new markets.!><• 
Nevertheless, there are necessary policies for a host country to 
maximize the FOI-led growth. Researchers find that the positive effect of 
FDI on economic growth is neither universal nor unconditional. In general, 
the host country must have a suflicient absorptive capacity to realize 
economic growth triggered by FDI. First of all, the FDI is beneficial when 
the host country has stable macro-economic frameworks and is open to 
trade.67 This include, for instance, a better financial systems and financial 
market regulations,6R and the property rights protections.6'1 If there is no 
such necessary environment, FDI may be harmful to economic growth 
because it only serves to enhance the private rate of return to investment 
from foreign firms, while offering little on social rates of returns in the 
host country. 70 
Second, human capital is an essential condition, as the adoption of 
new technologies and management skills requires a certain level of inputs 
from the labor. Empirical works find that technological spillover is 
possible only when the host country reaches a certain "threshold" level of 
human capital.71 The technological and human capital gaps between local 
firms and foreign investors cannot be "too great" because a large gap 
66. Luiz R. de Mello. Foreign Direct lnvesuncnt. International Knowledge Tmnsfers. and 
Endogenous Growth: Time Series Evidence (1996). Canterbury: University of Kent Dept. of 
Economics; Beata Smarzynska Javorcik. "Docs Foreign Direct Investment Increase the 
Productivity of Domestic Firms'! In search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages." 17u! 
American Economic &'l•iell', Vol. 94, Issue. 3 (200·H. pp. 605-627. 
67. Maile Alguacil, Ana Cuadros. and Vicente Orts. "Inward FDJ and Growth: The role of 
macroeconomic and institutional environment." Jmmwl of Poliq Mode/inK Vol. 33, Issue. 3 
(2011). pp. 1-496. 
68. Laum Alfaroa, Arccndam Chandab, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcanc. and Selin Sayekd. "FDJ 
and Economic Growth: the role oflocal financial markets." Journal oflnternational Economics. 
Vol. 64, Issue. I (2004). pp. HIJ-112; J. Benson Durham, "Absorptive Capacity and the Effects 
of Foreign Direct Investment and Equity Foreign Portfolio Investment on Economic Grov.1h." 
European Economic Re1•iew. Vol. 48. Issue. 2. (2004), pp. 285-306. 
69. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, "The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Protection of lntellcetual Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economics." European 
Economic Rel'iew, Vo1.48. Jssue.l, (2004 ), pp. 39-62. 
70. Venkataraman N. Balasubmmanyam. Mohammed Salisu. and David Sapsford ... 
Foreign Direct Investment and Gr0\\1h in EP and IS Countries." 7111! Economic Journal. Vol. 
106, No. 434 (Jun .• 1996), pp. 92-105. 
71. Eduardo Borensztein. Jose De Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee. "How Does Foreign 
Direct Investment Affect Economic Grov.1h'?" 
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hinders the spillover etlects.72 Kokko et al.n examine FDI in Mexico and 
Uruguay and find that in industries where the foreign affiliates have much 
higher productivity levels than local firms, the spillover effects are 
difficult to identify. Taken together, FDI is one of the primary factors that 
contribute to economic growth under the trend of globalization, 74 while 
literature also illustrate the importance of infrastructure, skills, 
macroeconomic stability, and human capitals in developing countries. 
D. The Function of Bilateral and Multi-Lateral Trade Agreement 
Regional trade agreements (RT A, or the Preferential Trade 
Agreement, PTA) have been the most popular form of trade liberalization 
in the past two decades. 75 In the 1990s, some people consider PT As as one 
of the main threats to the global trading system, while the concern has been 
shifting towards the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BT A) because of its rapid 
proliferation.76 In the Asia-Pacific region, BTAs became popular in the 
late 1990s with Japan, Singapore, South Korea and New Zealand as the 
early promoters. By 2000, the United States joined the regional trend, 
along with Australia, Thailand, and the PRC. One can observe that every 
country in the world today is a member of at least one PTA or BT A, while 
most are members of multiple BTAs. As of March 2017, there are 270 
RT As in force and 64 7 cumulative numbers of RT As, as notified to 
WTO/GA TT. 77 In the GATT era, the period of 1948-1994, 124 
notifications of RT As were sent to the Secretariat. Since the establishment 
of WTO in 1995, there were over 400 arrangements related to trade in 
goods or services signed and notified to the WTO. 
PTAs are popular for several reasons. The trend is partly due to the 
stalemates of multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO. Free trade 
agreements (FTA)-the most common types ofPTA78-between smaller 
72. Ari Kokko. "Technology, Market Characteristics, and Spillovers." 
73. Ari Kokko,Ruhen Tansini, and Mario C. Zejan. "Local technological capability ami 
productivity spillovers from FDI in the Uruguayan manufacturing sector." The .lollrnal of 
De•·e/opmellf St11dies, Vol.32, Issue. 4 ( 1996), pp. 602-611. 
74. llhan Ozturk," Foreign Direct Investment-Growth Nexus: A Review of Literature. ·· 
lntemational .lollmal of Applied Econometrics ami Quantitalil'e Studies, Vol. 4, Issue. 2, 
(2007), pp. 79-9H. 
75. Caroline Freund and Emanuel Omelas, "Regional Trade Agreements." Amuml Rel'iew 
of Economics, Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 139-166. 
76. Jayant Menon. "Bilateml Tmde Agreements." Asitm-Pac!lic l:'conomic l.itemllll'e, Vol. 
2, Issue. 12 (2007), pp. 29-47. 
77. Source from WTO Secretariat, 
https:/lwww. wto.org/cnglishltmtop_e/region_e/regfac_c.htrn. Accessed: 4/16/17. 
78. BT A can also take the form of Customs Union (CU) or a services agreement. which is 
often followed by a FTA. 
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numbers of economies may be easier to negotiate and be signed. The WTO 
Doha Round reinforced the sentiment, as many countries claim that the 
WTO fails to deliver proper results. Thus, many countries started to pursue 
their own trade liberalization agendas.i9 However, scholars have been 
debating the effects of FT As and some trade-offs between bilateral and 
multilateral trade regimes. 
First, from a purely economic self-interest view, researchers find that 
FT A has positive effects on members' trade flows. Baier and Bcrgstrand80 
find that FT A approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after 
ten years, on average. Caporale et al.111 examine the effects on trade flows 
of signing FTAs (European agreements) between the European Union 
(EU-15) and the Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania). They illustrate a significantly positive 
impact of FT As on trade volume and the export sector. When adding 
control group samples that did not sign an FT A with the EU members, 
specifically Belarus, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, one finds a 
significant impact of FrAs for the trade deal member states. These 
positive effects are results of the tariff changes, as well as the PTA-induced 
unobservable actions that effectively reduce trade costs, providing further 
incentives for investment and trade with partners.82 
Second, one of the fundamental principles of the multilateral trading 
regime is the most favored nation (MFN) treatment, which requires all 
members of the WTO to provide all other members with equal treatment 
in terms of trade. However, the PTA allows the partners to provide each 
other with better market access and trade conditions than MFN. 83 For the 
developing countries, signing BT As mean that they can receive increased 
market access for traditional and non-traditional exports. These regional-
based agreements encourage further specialization and pursuit of 
competitiveness. Indeed, there are trade-oft's for the countries involved in 
BT As. For example, countries receive more market access in exchange for 
79. Jayant Menon. ''Bilateml Trade Agreements." 
MO. Scott L.Baier and Jeffrey H. Bergstmnd. "Do free trade agreements actually increase 
members' intcmational tmde'!"' .Joumal c~(internalionall:"conomics, Vol. 71, Issue. I, (2007). 
pp. 72-95. 
R I. Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Christophe Rault, Robert Sova, and Anamaria Sova. "On 
the bilateral trade effects of free trade agreements between the EU-15 and the CEEC-4 
countries." Re1·iewc~{World Economics Vol. 145,1ssue. 2, (2009), pp. 189-206. 
82. James E. Anderson and Yoto V. Yotov. "Tcm1s of trade and global efficiency effects 
of free tmdc agreements, 1990 2002." .loumal of lntemalional Economics, Vol. 99 (March 
2016), pp.279-29R. 
83. Kenneth C. Shadlcn. "Exchanging Development for Market Access? Deep integration 
and industrial policy under multilateral and regional-bilateral trade agreements." Re1•iew of 
ltuemaliona/ Political Ecol!omy, Vol.l2, Issue. 5, (2005 ), pp. 750-775. 
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making significantly deeper concessions regarding the management of 
inward investment and intellectual policy.84 There will be new constraints 
regarding the management of FDI, the intellectual property, and the 
countries have to relinquish more regulatory instruments under the FT A 
rules. 
Third, some PT As are designed for one or more key sectors, focusing 
on expanding the trade liberalization into specific sectors or areas that may 
be ignored or too sensitive to deal with in multilateral levels. A 1-1 A can 
concentrate on rules for investment, intellectual property rights, or just for 
the service sector. For example, many of the FTAs pursued by the US with 
developing countries belong to this type.85 Involving only two or a small 
number of parties for agreement, a FT A faces fewer difficulties than a 
regional or multilateral pact that include multiple players and sectorial 
interests. Thus, BT As may have the potential to achieve deeper levels of 
economic integration, driven by specific sectors. 
Fourth, in contrast to the PTA that focuses on specific sectors, there 
are sector-excluding PT As, especially for agriculture, the most sensitive 
sector under the trend of liberalization. It is relatively easier in the PTA 
negotiations than in multilateral settings to manipulate rules to limit 
liberalization of sensitive sectors. For example, the Japan-Mexico FT A 
was designed to achieve further economic integration without the 
involvement of the agriculture in both countries. 86 
On the other hand, PTAs have various consequences. One of the most 
important characteristics of PT As is that there are competitions among 
countries to access certain markets, where country's decision of entering 
such trade deals is conditional on other countries' decision. In particular, 
the competition for foreign investment and market share is more 
significant for neighboring countries, as PT As help to gain more 
advantages over the competitors. Signing PT As lead to exclusive status of 
market access to another economy, triggering a snowballing or domino 
effectP For example, in the Asian Pacific region, the number of BTAs 
was doubling between 2002 and 2004, and the number has more than 
doubled again in 2007. Bladwin88 predicts that: 
8-1. Ibid. 
X5. Jayant Menon. "Bilateral trade agreements." 
X6. John Ravenhill. "The political economy of the new Asia-Pacific bilateralism: benign. 
banal, or simply bad'!, ·• in Vinod Agrawal and Shujiro Urata eds, /Jilatera/ Tracie Agreemems 
in the ..tsiCI·Pacijic. London: Routledge, 2006. pp. 27 49. 
87. Richard Baldwin. "Multilateralising regionalism: spaghetti bowls as building blocs on 
the path to global free trade." World Economy, Vol.29. Issue. II (2006). pp. 1-151 ~518. 
88. Richard Baldwin. "Managing the noodle bowl: The fragility of East Asian 
regionalism." 7111! Singapore Economic Rt'l'iell', Vol.53. Issue 3 (2008). pp. 4-19--178. 
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"[i]f history is any guide, the domino effect in East Asia will 
spread to many, many more countries in the neighborhood. In 
Europe, for example, the playing out of several waves of domino 
eflects has left the EU with preferential trade deals with every 
WTO members except nine. It is therefore conceivable that the 
13 members of the ASEAN+3 group will end up signing a very 
large number ofbilaterals in the coming years." 
Similarly, Gruber''~ argues that economically weaker countries may 
participate in plurilateral institutions that have little benefits for national 
interests simply because other countries' participation raises the costs of 
not participating in regional institutions. Guzman <Jo uses cases from least 
developed countries and argues that fear of a neighboring country entering 
into an agreement with the US and other major economies is a primary 
factor that least developed countries sign treaties that may bring side 
effects. For example, they fear the potential loss on the economic market 
share and exclusion from regional affairs. 
These competition effects and the exclusive nature of PTA may 
hinder economic liberalization and the general welfares. Economists tind 
that the loss of the non-member partners could outweigh the gains to 
partners, reducing the overall efficiency of the world economic system.91 
Although BT As may enhance the economic performance of the member 
countries, Scollay and Gilbert,92 for instance, found that all BT As in the 
Asia Pacific region hann the welfare of particular non-member countries. 
They also find that the New Zealand-Singapore agreement is an exception, 
having little negative effects on others because they have already adopted 
MFN tariff rates that are close to zero, which minimize the distortion 
introduced by PT As. However, most of the PT As still biased economic 
liberalization towards the member countries. 
PT As have negative impacts on the broad-based multilateral 
liberalization via several mechanisms. From the viewpoint of political 
economic analyses, PTA results in disproportionate gains to certain groups 
with different factor endowments.'n These groups may be powerful 
89. Lloyd Gruber. Ruling tire World: Power politics and the rise l!{ supranational 
institution.\-. Princeton University Press, 2000. 
90. Andrew T Guzman "Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularity 
of bilateral investment treaties." Virginia Joumal of lmemationall.tlw, Vol 639 ( 1997). 
91. James E. Anderson and Yoto V. Yotov. "Tem1s of Trade and Global Efficiency Effects 
of Free Trade Agreements, 1990 2002." 
92. Robert Scollay and John Gilbert. New Regional Trading Arrangemellls in the Asia 
Pacific. Washington. DC: Institute for International Economics, May 200 I. 
93. Philip I. Levy, "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements." 71re 
American Economic Rel'iew, Vol. 87, No.4 (Scp., 1997), pp. 506-519. 
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enough to prevent further liberalization of trade because it will destroy the 
rents created by the PT As.'14 
From an economists' view, PTAs may have side effects as well. For 
example, McLaren95 finds that the expected regionalism and PTAs create 
its own demand for the main economic actors in each country, as it 
diminishes the ex-post demand for multilateral free trade based on 
negotiating costs and sector-specific sunk investments. The expected 
trading bloc motivates the major economic actors and private agents in 
each member country to invest in specialized sectors vis-a-vis the member 
states but become less interested in trading with non-members. Therefore, 
PT As can be harmful to a global free trade regime. 
Taken together, the PT As between a small number of countries are 
beneficial to trade liberalization in a partially manner. The .. remedies for 
multilateral trade regime" in response to the proliferating PTAs do exist,96 
but there may be lacking incentives to do so, as the expected cost of being 
excluded in the PT As is high for individual countries. 
III. THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT TO ESTABLISHMENT 
OF TRADE AGREEMENT WITHOUT FORMAL 
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
To better address various difliculties of the ROC establish bilateral 
or to join multi-lateral economic agreements, it is important to understand 
the balance of power between the United States and PRC. After the end of 
the Cold War, PRC has managed to become the second largest economic 
and military entity while maintaining an authoritarian regime. Though the 
United States and PRC maintain high volumes of trade and financial 
investments, the power transition theory argues that PRC's role as an 
emerging power may create potential military conflict in the future.97 
Under the context of the power transition theory, ROC then becomes a 
potential bargaining chip utilized by both PRC and the United States. For 
94. Pr.win Krishna, "Regionalism and Multilateral ism: A political economy approach." 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113. Issue. I ( 1998), pp. 227-251. 
95. John McLaren. "A theory of insidious regionalism." 71u! Quarter(\· .loumal of 
Economics. Vol.ll7. Issue. 2. (21102). pp. 571-608. 
96. Jayant Menotl. "Dealing with the Proliferation of Bilateral Free Tmdc Agreements." 
71u• World /:'conom.l', Vol. 32. Issue. 10 (2009), pp. 131!1-1407. 
97. Sec Douglas Lemke and William Reed, "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: 
Power Transition Theory and the Democmtic Peace," lntemationa/lnteractions, Vol. 22, No.2 
( 1996), pp. 143-164; Douglas Lemke and Ronald L. Tammen, "Power Tmnsition Theory and 
the Rise of China," llllanational/nteractions. Vol. 29, No. 4 (2003 ). pp. 269-271: and Steve 
Chan. China. the US and the Pmtw·-Transition 1heory: A Critique, Routledge (2007). 
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example, in a December II, 2016 television interview with Fox News, the 
president-elect Donald Trump expressed: 
I fully understand the One-China policy. But I don't know 
why we have to be bound by a One-China policy unless we 
make a deal with China having to do with other things, including 
trade. I mean, look, we're being hurt very badly by China with 
devaluation, with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don't 
tax them, with building a massive fortress in the middle of the 
South China Sea, which they shouldn't be doing. And, frankly, 
they're not helping us at all with North Korea. You have North 
Korea, you have nuclear weapons, and China could solve that 
problem. And they're not helping us at all. 
So, I don't want China dictating to me. And this was a call put 
into me. I didn't make the call. And it was a call, very short call, 
saying, "Congratulations, sir, on the victory." It was a very nice 
call. Short. And why should some other nation be able to say, I 
can't take a call? I think it would have been very disrespectful, 
to be honest with you, not taking it.'J8 
However, after Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 45'h President 
of the United States on January 20, 2017, in a telephone call conversation 
in February with the President ofPRC, XI Jinping, he reversed his position 
and stated that he would honor the One China policy. This exemplifies 
ROC's role within the tension between PRC and the United States. Such 
event also reveals the tangible struggle for ROC to achieve any foreign 
relations without approaching or receiving explicit or implicit approval 
from the United States and PRC. 
We develop several theoretical scenarios to demonstrate how ROC 
would be able to manage to pursuit bilateral or multi-lateral trade 
agreements without having formal diplomatic relations with other nations 
by considering the balance of power between the United States and PRC. 
In our unique spatial models, there exist three parameters: ( l) the foreign 
relations between PRC and the United States, (2) the foreign relations 
between ROC, PRC, and the United States, and (3) the foreign relations of 
the targeted nation (the potential state to establish a bilateral trade 
agreement with ROC) with ROC. Among these three parameters, there are 
four strategic actions: ( l) the foreign relations between ROC and the 
targeted States move closer or more distant, (2) the foreign relations 
between PRC and the United States move closer or more distant, ( 3) ROC 
98. Shelley Rigger. ··Donald Trump is No Friend of Taiwan:· Foreit.:fl Poli(l' ReJearch 
Institute (March 16'h, 2017), http://www.fpri.orglarticle/2017103/donald-trump-is-no-friend-of-
taiwanl (assessed March 20'h, 2017). 
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changes its position along the relations between PRC and the United 
States, and (4) the foreign relations between the targeted nation and the 
United States or PRC move closer or more distance. 
In these spatial models, we have three assumptions. The first 
assumption is that the diplomatic interests of the targeted nation toward 
ROC are aligned with its foreign relations with the United States or China. 
This means, if the targeted nation has stronger foreign relations with the 
United States and ROC also has stronger foreign relations with the United 
States, its relationship ties with ROC will be stronger, and vice versa. The 
second assumption is that given the targeted nation maintains balanced 
relations with PRC and the United States (not leaning to neither actors), 
when the targeted nation changes its foreign relations with ROC, its 
foreign relations with PRC and the United States will remain unchanged. 
The last assumption is that an increase of the targeted nation's ties with 
PRC or the United States is a direct loss of its ties with the other nation. 
That is, for the targeted nation, its foreign relations with PRC and the 
United States are a zero-sum game. 
The logic behind these assumptions is that, as the power balance 
between the United States and PRC becomes more intense along with the 
unavoidable economic globalization, it is difiicult for any existing states 
to completely isolate itself and resist establishing foreign tics with either 
state. In addition, both the United States and PRC have incentives to 
increase their influence on existing state entities to gain advantage over 
their competitors. Therefore, under the context of the power competition 
between the United States and PRC, a state cannot gain better alignment 
with PRC or the United States without costing foreign relations with the 
other. ROC, on the other hand, has to balance its relationship between the 
United States and PRC, given its international status. A signal to change 
the status quo from another state to ROC is also a signal to the United 
States and PRC. 
To better present our models, we visualize the relationships between 
ROC, PRC, the United States, and the targeted nation in Figure I. The 
distances between ROC to the United States and PRC indicate the foreign 
relations between them: the closer the distance, the stronger the relations 
are between the pair of states. The distance between the targeted nation 
and ROC represents the likelihood of establishing a bilateral trade 
agreement between them: the closer the distance, the higher likelihood it 
is to establish such trade agreement. 
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Figure 1: The Basic Model 
Figure l, then, is the basic model where the distance between each pair 
of the states are moderate and the targeted nation maintains neutral 
relations with both the United State and PRC. To begin, Jet first move the 
relations between ROC and the targeted nation closer while holding all 
other relations constant, as shown in Figure 2. ln this scenario, the targeted 
nation is a relatively independent state within the power balance between 
the United States and ROC in which such state does not take a clear stance 
along with PRC nor the United States. Because of its independent status, 
this nation will be minimally influenced by both states. Once the targeted 
nation is immune to both the major powers, then formal or informal 
diplomatic approaches become a viable option for both states to engage in 







Figure 2: A Closer Foreign Relations between ROC and the Targeted Nation 
That is, once the targeted nation is capable of resisting the influences 
from both PRC and the United States, the likelihood of a bilateral trade 
agreement to emerge between ROC and the targeted nation will be higher. 
Therefore, it leads to the first proposition: 
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Proposition I: The likelihood of establishing a free trade agreemellf 
between ROC and the nation which maintains balanced foreign 
relations with PRC cmd the United States is high. 
Based on Figure 2, there exist two more potential variations. First, as 
shown in Figure 3, when the foreign relations between PRC and the United 
States arc worsened, meaning that the power completion between these 
two nations is escalated and the potential conflict between them is more 
likely, ROC and the targeted nation will have a better chance of making 
diplomatic or trade arrangements with each other. To begin, when United 
States and China alienate each other, it results in severe competition. 
Under such circumstance, each side has incentive to maintain the status 
quo with ROC to avoid potential aggravation between each other. If the 
status quo between US-China relations were changed due to the change of 
the status of ROC, a potential conflict could emerge. In addition, in such 
circumstance, as a state holding independent relations with the United 
States and PRC, the potential influence imposed by these two major states 
will be lower as they will aim to increase diplomatic ties with existing 
allies to strengthen its power. It is difficult to alter the relations of the 
targeted nation with both the United States and China by both actors since, 
by doing so, they will unavoidably cause a change in the status quo and 
lead to instability. For the targeted nation, it is also wise to stay 
independent to avoid being dragged into the conflict. This mechanism 
leads to the second proposition: 
Proposition 2: The likelihood of establishing a free trade agreement 
between ROC and the nation which maintains balanced foreign 
relations with PRC and the United States is high when the US-China 
relations are worsened. 
le~~ influence over the 
tarseted nation 
Figure 3: A Polarized US-China Relation 
Less influence over the 
tarseted nation 
Second, when the US-China relations improves, both nations will have 
stronger diplomatic and economic ties with the targeted nations since the 
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distances between the targeted nation and PRC and the United States are 
closer. That is, under a world system with polarized US-China relations, 
the targeted nation will face more difficulties in maintaining its 
independent relations and in seeking opportunities of cooperation with any 
of these two major states. Benign US-China relations enable the targeted 
nation to improve its foreign relations without sacrificing its independent 
status. In addition, as the US-China relations improves, the diplomatic 
space of ROC will nonetheless diminish and its international status and 
sovereignty may be sacrificed by PRC and the United States, although 
trying to maintain its independence with both PRC and the United States. 
As a result, an improved US-China relation will suppress ROC's potential 
in coordinating and further establishing any forms of bilateral trade 
agreement with the targeted nation, as well as other states. Figure 4 then 
visualizes this mechanism and leads to the third proposition: 
Proposition 3: The likelihood of establishing a free trade agreement 
between ROC and the nation, which maintains balanced jiJreign 
relations with PRC and the United States, is low when the US-China 
relations are improved. 
Pressuring the targeted 
nation 
Figure 4: A Closer US-China Relation 
Pressuring the targeted 
nation 
The previous spatial models and their associated propositions assume 
ROC's foreign relations with PRC and the United States arc independent. 
Now, let assume ROC's position within the US-China relations is mobile, 
meaning that ROC can choose to improve its diplomatic relations with 
either PRC or the United States. Since the model assumes that ROC's 
position within the US-China relations is a zero-sum game, an increasing 
tie between ROC and PRC or the United States is a direct loss for its 
relations with the United States and PRC. respectively. On the one hand, 
when ROC's relations with PRC are improved, PRC then will be more 
willing to allow its allies to form a stronger economic tie with ROC, as 
such diplomatic and economic relations arc most likely, given the 
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condition that ROC and PRC's allies all embrace the One China Policy 
and are fully aware of the boundary that PRC has agreed with. On the other 
hand, when ROC's relations with the United States are improved, it 
unavoidably results in a hostile environment for US-China relations as the 
new US-ROC relations arc flowing into a direction against PRC's 
irredentism for ROC on Taiwan. As for the United States to maintain its 
ties with ROC, approaching allies of the United States that disagree with 
PRC's international status or other sociopolitical positions, such as human 
rights violation and its authoritarian features, then becomes a viable route 
for ROC to establish bilateral trade agreements. Accordingly, the 
likelihood of a bilateral trade agreement between ROC and the targeted 
nation is higher given the following two conditions: (I) the ROC-PRC or 
the ROC-US relations arc improved, and (2) the targeted nation has a 
stronger diplomatic tie with PRC or the United States, respectively. Figure 
5a and 5b demonstrate this scenario along with the fourth proposition of 
the model: 
Proposition 4a: The likelihood of establishing a .free trade agreement 
between ROC and the nation, which maintains closerforeign relations 
with PRC, is high when ROC improves itsJin·eign relations with PRC. 
Proposition 4b: The likelihood of establishing a .free trade agreement 
between ROC and the nation, which maiflfains closerforeign relations 
with the United States, is high when ROC improves its .fiJreign 
relations with the United States. 
Figure So: A Closer Foreign Relation between ROC, the United States, and the Targeted 
Notions 
Figure Sb: A Closer Foreign Relation between ROC, PRC, and the Targeted Notions 
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Proposition I to 5 describe how ROC can establish bilateral trade 
agreements with other nations within the existing US-China framework 
and the struggle from the One China Policy. One of the major theoretical 
mechanisms is that it is possible for ROC to initiate a bilateral trade 
agreement, which can further improve its economy. Nevertheless, it 
requires the ROC government to acknowledge and accurately calculate its 
position within the current US-China relations and diplomatic relations 
between the targeted nation and the United States and China. 
With regard to ROC's participation in multi-lateral trade agreements, 
again, given the current international framework and the major consensus 
to the One China Policy by both PRC and the United States, such 
participation requires strong approval by PRC, the United States, or both. 
This is diflicult to achieve as PRC will utilize its influences over other 
nations to suppress any international recognition of ROC, while the United 
States also lacks the incentive to promote ROC by raising a potential 
conflict with PRC. In addition, any drastic changes along with the current 
US-China relations may create unpredictable consequences to their 
position on ROC's future. Thus, an explicit or implicit agreement by the 
United States or PRC is needed to warrant any forms of ROC's 
participation in multi-lateral trade agreements, given the current US-China 
relations. 
The following section reviews two bilateral trade agreements that 
ROC established without having formal diplomatic relations. The 
Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP) 
demonstrates how ROC achieved a bilateral trade agreement with 
Singapore by improving its relations with PRC (Proposition 4a), and the 
Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic Cooperation 
(ANZTEC) demonstrates how ROC established a bilateral trade 
agreement with New Zealand when the US-China relations were worsened 
(Proposition 2). 
IV. CASE STUDY: AGREEMENT BETWEEN SINGAPORE 
AND THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF 
TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN, AND MATSU ON 
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHP (ASTEP) 
The Agreement hetwccn Singapore and the Separate Customs 
Territory ofTaiwan, Penghu. Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership 
(ASTEP) took force on April I 9, 2014. This agreement is a comprehensive 
trade agreement with 17 chapters on economic cooperation, dispute 
settlement, trade liberalization, trade in goods and services, and WTO-
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plus9'1 provisions on competition, e-commerce and investment. 100 
According to the Taiwan WTO and Regional Trade Agreement (RT A) 
Center at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), 
ASTEP removes 81.03 percent of tarifTs from Singapore upon 
implementation: the remaining 16.45 percent of tariffs will be minimized 
to zero in 15 years. 101 In addition, within these 15 years, ASTEP will 
increase Taiwan's exports to Singapore by $782 million US dollars and 
imports by $719 million US dollars. 102 
Singapore and ROC have maintained long-term benign diplomatic 
relations since their early times. Singapore was independent in 1965. As a 
former British colony, the initial plan for merging Malaysia and Singapore 
was unsuccessful due to the political conflict between the first Malaysian 
Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the founding father of 
Singapore, LEE Kuan Yew (LKY). Since then, Singapore has constructed 
itself as a non-race-based state in Southeast Asia. 103 
After Singapore's independence, due to the irreconcilable tensions 
with Malaysia and communist threats from Southeast Asia, constructing a 
sustainable defense force was one of the major challenges for Singapore 
to maintain its sovereign state status. In the I 960s and 1970s, seeking a 
reliable military assistance from major powers was difficult. On the one 
hand, the United States was trapped in the Vietnam War. On the other 
hand, the United Kingdom was unable to provide such assistance because 
of its relations with Malaysia, one of the potential hostile states to 
Singapore yet another former British colony. ROC on Taiwan then became 
a viable option for Singapore, with its military preparedness and 
experiences of warfare against Japan and the Communist insurgency. 
Since 1967, ROC has sent military officers to Singapore. In 1975, 
during the meeting between LKY and CHIANG Chin-kuo, the former 
President of ROC, ROC and Singapore materialized the signing of the 
99. WTO-plus indicates a bilateral trade agreement that goes over and above existing WTO 
commitments. 
100. The legal text of ASTEP can be found here: https://www.icsingaporc.gov.sgn-rade-
From-Singapore/ASTEP/Legal-Text (accessed March 1", 2017). 
I II I. Taiwan WTO and RTA Center, CJI.:R, "The Economic Impact Analysi~ uf tlu; A STEP 
Agreement'' (In Chinese), commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taipei (2013), 
http://www.moea.gov.tw/CWS/tse/content!SubMenu.aspx'!menu_id=5536 (accessed March I". 
2017). 
102. Taiwan WTO and RTA Center, CIER. "The Economic Impact Analysis of the ASTEP 
Agreement" (In Chinese). 
I 03. Stephan Ortmann. "Singapore: "ll1e Politics of Inventing National Identity," .loumal of 
Curre111 Sowheast Asia11 Affairs. Vol. 28. No.4 (2009), pp. 23-46. 
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Training Protocol. 10-l As a result, military personnel from the Singapore 
Armed Forces came to Taiwan and received military training. Such 
military cooperation is unusual in international relations, as Singapore 
terminated its diplomatic relations with ROC in 1990. A defense 
cooperation between two non-diplomatic states is rare. Nevertheless, the 
stable military cooperation is evident by the positive foreign relations 
between ROC and Singapore. 
With the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between PRC 
and Singapore, Singapore's relations with PRC have since been greatly 
improved. Nevertheless, an increasing tie between Singapore and PRC 
does not seem to hinder its military cooperation with ROC on Taiwan. 
This is largely due to the post-Cold War international environment when 
PRC wanted to reshape its international image as an icon of peace and 
improve its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). While PRC has tried to reframe its international image since 
the 1990s, Singapore under LKY also aimed to serve as the bridge within 
the cross-strait negotiations. Statistically, LKY made 25 trips to ROC and 
33 trips to PRC during his tern1, indicating an equal emphasis on both 
nations regarding its foreign relations. 105 To Htcilitate the improvement of 
the cross-strait relations, LKY played a critical role in materializing the 
first meeting between both PRC and ROC through the Strait Exchange 
Foundation (SEF) and the Association of Relations Across the Taiwan 
Straits (ARA TS) established in 1991. 106 Worth noticing, SEF and ARA TS 
also materialized the 1993 "Koo-Wang meeting" between the chairpersons 
of both organizations, KOO Chen-fu and WANG Daohan, which led to 
four general agreements that provide the legal grounds tor future 
negotiations and coordination, where the meeting was, nonetheless, held 
in Singapore. 
As evident, Singapore has long been an effective bridge between PRC 
and ROC since its independence. LKY's and his successor, LEE Hsien 
Loon's position on maintaining peaceful and stable cross-strait relations 
and supporting the One China policy clearly is welcome by PRC and 
Kuomintang's (KMT) government. Though the Ma-Xi meeting in 2015 at 
Singapore between the President of ROC, MA Ying-jeou, and the 
President ofPRC, XI Jinping, occurred after the ratification of ASTEP, it 
104. Kuan Yew Lee, From Third World to First: 77u· Singapore Story: 1965-2000, 
Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions (2000). 
105. Shuhei Yamada, "Who's Right, the Late Lee Kuan Yew or Taiwanese'!", Nikkei Asian 
Re1•iell' (20 15 ), http:/ /asia.nikkei.com/Pol ities-Economy/lntcmationai-Relations/Who-s-right-
thc-late-Lee-Kuan-Yew-or-Taiwanese (accessed March 1", 2017 ). 
106. Pasha L. Hsieh, "Legitimacy of Taiwan's Trade Negotiations with China: 
Demystifying Political Challenges," l'olitiml Science, Vol. 61!, No. I (January 2016). 
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indicates the importance of Singapore in the cross-strait negotiations. One 
of the prior conditions of the Ma-Xi meeting was the reaffirmation of the 
1992 consensus (the One China policy), where all three key actors, PRC, 
ROC under KMT's administration, and Singapore, agreed to it. 
Applying Proposition 4b, the likelihood of establishing a free trade 
agreement between ROC and the nation that maintains closer foreign 
relations with the United States is high when ROC improves its foreign 
relations with the United States, Singapore could clearly fit itself into the 
role of the target nation. Compared to the triangular relations between 
ROC, PRC, and Singapore in the early 2000s, where ROC on Taiwan was 
under CHEN Sui-bian's DPP administration, both ROC and Singapore had 
greatly improved their relations with PRC through the reaffirmation ofthe 
1992 consensus during MA Ying-jeou's KMT administration. On the one 
hand, ROC during Ma' s administration between 2008 and 20 16 had 
dramatically altered the cross-strait relations during Chen's 
administration. CHEN Sui-bian, as the former President of ROC whose 
political ideology clearly leans toward independence of Taiwan, proposed 
"Four Wants and One Without" in 2007: Taiwan wants independence, 
Taiwan wants the rectification of its name, Taiwan wants a new 
constitution, Taiwan wants development, and Taiwanese politics is 
without the question of left or right, but only the question of unification or 
independence. This proposal altered the cross-strait relations and led to a 
hostile attitude from PRC, as in the earlier time. Chen's speech in his 
inauguration ceremony was the "Four Noes One Without" in 2000, where 
he stated that his administration would not declare Taiwanese 
independence, change the national title from "the Republic of China" to 
"the Republic of Taiwan," include the doctrine of special state-to-state 
relations in the Constitution of the Republic of China, or promote a 
referendum on unification or independence. 
KMT won the presidential election of 2008, which was marked as the 
third power alternation in ROC's road toward democratic consolidation. 
MA Ying-jeo had served as the President of ROC between 2008 and 2016 
(reelected in 20 12). His cross-strait policy was significantly different to 
Chen's. Ma's administration was leaned heavily towards PRC. During his 
administration, ROC and PRC established a preferential trade agreement, 
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECF A), which was 
signed by CHIANG Pin-kung, the chairman of SEF, and CHEN Yunlin, 
the President of ARA TS, during the fifth round of SEF-ARA TS talk on 
June 29, 2010 in Chongqing, China. Approved by ROC's Executive Yuan 
(the executive branch) on July 2, 2010 and ratified by the Legislative Yuan 
(the legislative branch) on August 17 of the same year, it came into force 
in January I, 2011. Under the framework ofECFA, two major negotiations 
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have spurred across Ma's administration, including the Cross-Strait Goods 
Trade Agreement (CSGT A) and the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement 
(CSSTA). The fonner has been through 12 rounds of negotiations but is 
currently inactive due to the power alternation from KMT to Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) under the new President TSAI Ing-wen. The latter 
was signed on June 21, 2013 but not ratified by the Legislative Yuan due 
to the Sunflower Student Movement in March 2014. 107 
All these negotiations and moves arc evidence of ROC's improved 
relations toward PRC during Ma's administration that helped Singapore, 
a nation state that holds benign relations with both countries in the past 
interactions, mature a bilateral trade agreement with ROC in 2014. 
Without Ma's endless efforts in sending positive signals to PRC's 
government, it would have been ditlicult for PRC to allow a third party 
state to engage in trade conversations with ROC. Similarly, without the 
PRC's implicit approval, ROC would not have had the opportunity to 
initiate trade conversations with Singapore. The case analysis of the 
triangular relationship between PRC, ROC, and Singapore implies that the 
maturation of ASTEP was largely due to an improving tie between these 
three nations under the 1992 consensus (the One China policy). 
To further elaborate on the case of ASTEP, once the cross-strait 
relations between PRC and ROC is improved, a friendly country of both 
PRC and ROC becomes a relatively easy target for ROC to develop a 
bilateral trade conversation, as PRC would lessen its influence and 
pressure on the country. This can be interpreted as a friendly signal from 
Beijing's administration to Taipei. As long as the non-negotiable 1992 
consensus (the One China policy) is finnly acknowledged by both the 
country and ROC, PRC will provide certain diplomatic spaces for ROC to 
improve its visibility and international cooperation in the global political 
arena. This signal is important to PRC since it provides stronger incentives 
for the ROC government to keep increasing its diplomatic and economic 
ties with PRC, which leads to a relatively unilateral dependency of ROC 
on PRC. This is definitely a welcomed scenario from PRC's perspective. 
The ultimate goal of PRC in dealing with the cross-strait issue is to seek a 
peaceful reunification with ROC. Nevertheless, the domestic sentiment 
I 07. The Sunflower Student Movement is a protest against the mtification of the Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement (CSST A) by the Legislative Yuan in ROC on Taiwan. For details, 
please sec Cindy Sui, "Will the Sunflower Movement change Taiwan?", BBC (April 91h, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-321572 10 (accessed March 1''. 2017): Jin Kai, "Hong 
Kong and Taiwan: Populism or Democracy'!", The Diplomat (April 16'h, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com!20 15/04/hong-kong-and-tai wan-populism-or-democracy/ (accessed 
March I". 2017); and Shang-su Wu, "Opposition Ascendancy Won't Release Taiwan from 
China's Grip," 111e Diplomat (December gth, 2014 ), http://thcdiplomat.com/20 14/12/opposition-
asccndancy-wont-rclease-taiw;m-from-chinas-gripl (accessed March 1". 2017). 
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toward PRC in ROC on Taiwan has been hostile since the 2000s. Thus, a 
friendly signal from PRC to ROC, through its implicit agreement for ROC 
to improve its international spaces, then is crucial as an attempt to alter 
Taiwan's domestic perception toward PRC. 
Though a bilateral trade agreement under the scenario of Proposition 
4b, as exemplified by the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic 
Partnership (ASTEP), may in the long round damage ROC on Taiwan's 
sovereignty, its potential in creating mutual economic gains for both 
participants, ROC and Singapore, are foreseeable. In addition, the signing 
and ratification of ASTEP is also marked as one of the diplomatic 
breakthroughs after the UN Resolution 2758 within ASEAN states. 
ASTEP also demonstrates an optimistic future for ROC to increase its 
economic development under the current rapid globalized world. As ROC 
has been struggling with significant economic improvement, both the 
achievements in diplomacy and economy are essential to ROC because it 
allows a possible reentry to international society. The future impact of 
ASTEP will be shown in the following years and it may greatly advance 
ROC's relations with other ASEAN countries, even generating more 
possible bilateral trade agreements through the New Southern Bound 
Policy under Tsai's administration. 
V. CASE STUDY: AGREEMENT BETWEEN NEW 
ZEALAND AND THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS 
TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN, AND 
MATSU ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION (ANZTEC) 
The Economic Cooperation Agreement between New Zealand and the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu 
(ANZTEC), a bilateral comprehensive trade agreement between ROC and 
New Zealand, was signed at Victoria University of Wellington on July 10, 
2013 by Elliott Charng, Representative of the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Office (TECO) in Wellington, and Stephen Payton, the director 
of the New Zealand Commerce and Industrial Office (NZCIO) in 
Taipci. 108 ANZTEC is designed to reduce all tariffs to zero over the course 
of 12 years. ROC agreed to reduce the tariffs of 99.88 percent of New 
Zealand's imports to zero, and New Zealand agreed to reduce the tariffs 
of I 00 percent of ROC's import to zero. ANZTEC was ratified by the 
Legislative Yuan of ROC on October 29,2013. 
101!. The full text of ANZTEC can be found here: 
http://www.nzcio.cornltaiwanlrelationship-bctwccn-ncw-zcaland-and-taiwan.lanztcc-econornic-
coopcration-agrccmcnt (accessed March I". 2017). 
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According to the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research 
(CIER), ANZTEC is expected to generate ROC's gross domestic product 
(GOP) by $303 million US dollars and create 6255 job opportunities. 109 In 
addition to the potential economic benefits to both nations, ANZTEC also 
marks Taiwan's first bilateral economic agreement with a country lacking 
formal diplomatic relations. Since ROC and New Zealand do not have 
diplomatic relations, the negotiations had to be delegated by a private non-
governmental negotiator from the New Zealand side. 110 Surprisingly, the 
negotiation and signing process was generally welcomed by PRC 
government. 111 
Unlike the ROC-Singapore relations, New Zealand does not play a 
crucial role in the cross-strait negotiations, nor does it have military 
training programs with ROC government. Jason Yang contends that the 
economic reason is the main driving force of ANZTEC, as he states: 
Taiwan is New Zealand's eight-largest goods export market, taking 
NZ$850 million in the year to May 2013. The benefits of ANZTEC 
for New Zealand exporters are substantial. Phasing out current tariffs 
of 5 to 20 per cent in Taiwan's dairy industry on New Zealand trade 
of US$242 million is estimated to lead to annual savings of US$20 
million. Taiwan tariffs of 6 percent on beef and 15 percent on sheep 
meat on an annual trade of NZ$208 million cost New Zealand 
exporters NZ$18 million annually. These will be phased out within 
two to four years. New Zealand horticulture exporters will enjoy 
immediate elimination of a 20 per cent tariff on apple exports valued 
at NZ$21 million. The economic rationale is, therefore, the primary 
driver for New Zealand entering the agreement. 112 
But we argue that the realization of ANZTEC can also be understood 
under the context of the changing dynamics of the US-China relations. 
In the early years of Obama's administration, some positive 
interactions were evident. For example, during a phone conversation 
between Barack Obama and HU Jintao on November 8, 2008, both parties 
emphasized the further development of the US-China relations in the 
109. Taiwan WTO and RT A Center, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER 
), "The Economic Impact Analysis of the ANZTEC Agreement" (Chinese), commissioned 
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Taipei (2013), http://www.moea.gov.tw/CWS/tnc 
lhomeJHomc.aspx (accessed March 1". 2017). 
110. Jason Yang, "Space for Taiwan in Regional Economic Integration: Cooperation and 
Partnership with New Zealand and Singapore," J>olitiml Science, Vol. 66, No. I (2014), pp. 3-
22. 
Ill. Jason Yang, "Space for Taiwan in Regional Economic lntegmtion: Cooperation and 
Partnership with New Zealand and Singapore," p. 15. 
112. Jason Yang, "Space for Taiwan in Regional Economic Integration: Cooperation and 
Partnership with New Zealand and Singapore," p. 13. 
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interest of both nations and the world. 113 Moreover, the Strategic 
Economic Dialogue, 114 which was initiated by the former US president 
George W. Bush and the former President of PRC, HU Jintao, was 
designed to discuss mutual economic relations and issues between PRC 
and the United States in 2006, was broadened to the US-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). The format of these dialogues is to have 
high-level representatives of both countries and their associated 
delegations to meet annually at capitals alternating between the two 
countries. To date, S&ED has materialized eight rounds oftalks, with the 
last one held in Beijing on June 6-7, 2016. S&ED provides opportunities 
for PRC and the United States to bridge their preferences and interests 
regarding various global issues and negotiate some potential resolutions 
toward these issues. These interactions evidence the formation of the 
Group ofTwo (G2) by PRC and the United States. 
Though there were signs indicating a brighter future of the US-China 
relations, some unresolvable issues worsened their relations within 
Obama's administration. The first confrontation, which challenges the US-
China relations, is trade deficit. According to the United States Census 
Bureau, the trade deficit with PRC raised from $227 billion US dollars to 
$347 billion dollars from 2009 to 20 16_1 15 To further elaborate this 
problem with Obama's administration, Congressman Paul Ryan states: 
Free trade is a powerful tool for peace and prosperity, but our trading 
partners need to play by the rules. This challenge focuses on China. 
They steal our intellectual property rights, they block access to their 
markets, and they manipulate their currency. President Obama said he 
would stop these practices. He said he'd go to the mat with China. 
Instead, they are treating him like a doormat. We're not going to let 
that happen. Mitt Romney and I are going to crack down on China 
cheating and we're going to make sure that trade works for 
Americans. 116 
113. "Chinese President, Obama Discuss Relations, lnt'l Issues on Phone," Xinhua Net 
(November !J'h, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200S-II/09/content_l 032R375.htm 
(accessed March I''. 2017). 
114. During 2006 to 2008, there were five meetings: I. December 14 -15, 2006 (Beijing); 2. 
May 22-23,2007 (Washington. DC); 3. December 12-13,2007 (Beijing); 4. June 17 18, 2008 
(Annapolis, MD); and 5. December 4 5, 2008 (Beijing). For details, see Bill Powell, "Paulson 
in China: ·n1e Monster Under the Red," Time (December 5'h, 2008), 
http://content.time.comltime/world/article/0,8599,1 864669,00.html (accessed March I". 2017). 
115. For details, please sec https://www.ccnsus.gov/forcign-tradc/balancc/c5700.htrnl#2008 
(accessed March I". 2017). 
116. Sabrina Siddiqui, "Paul Ryan: China Is treating Obama 'Like a Doormat'," The 
1/uffingtoll Post (August 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 12/0S/16/paul-ryan-
china_n_l790453.html (accessed March!", 2017). 
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In addition, Wayne Morrison in his Congressional Research Service piece 
also provides a general concern about the trade deficit: 
Some analysts contend that the large U.S. merchandise trade deficits 
with China indicate that the trade relationship is somehow unbalanced. 
unfair, and damaging to the U.S. economy. Others argue the large U.S. 
trade deficit with China is more of a reflection of global shifts in 
production as well as the emergence of extensive and complex supply 
chains, where China is often the final point of assembly for export-
oriented multinational firms that source goods from multiple 
countries} 17 
Perhaps the most astonishing critique regarding trade deficit from PRC 
was Obama's closing speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
summit in 20 II, where he expressed that the United States was fed up with 
PRC's trade and currency practices and demanded China to behave like a 
"grown up."11 x The United States pursued the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) under Obama's administration, which, if ratified, would empower 
the United States to strengthen its economic and diplomatic tics with other 
allies and serve as the balancer against the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, where PRC has played an important role. The 
realization of TPP will reduce the economic dependency of the United 
States on PRC: however, it is currently terminated by the current President 
Donald Trump's administration. 
Aside from trade deficit, the difference in "values" is another major 
obstacle challenging the US-China relations. The United States has long 
been the fighter tor democratic norms and practices since the end of the 
Cold War, while PRC has remained as an authoritarian regime under the 
control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since its birth in 1950. One 
of the major confrontations between the United States and PRC is human 
rights. During the meeting between Barack Obama and HU Jintao in 20 II, 
Obama questioned Hu on China's human rights records. 11 '1 PRC's 
mistreatments against Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols in the Inner 
Mongolia were well known in the world. Stresses and concerns from other 
nations and international human rights organizations demanding PRC to 
117. Wayne M. Morrison, "China-U.S. Trade Issues,'' Conwessional Research Sen•ice 
(March 2017), p. 9. 
118. Matt Spetalnick and Doug Palmer, ''Obama to China: llchave like a "grown up"," 
Rewers (November 14'h, 2011 ). http://www.reuters.com/articlc/ 
us-apec-idUSTRE7AB 12920111114 (accessed March I". 2017). 
119. Sec "Hu Jintao Questioned by Barack Obama on China's Human Rights Record," 111e 
Guardian (January 19'h, 2011 ), https:/lwww.thcguardian.com/world/20 11/jan/19/hu-jintao-
human-rights-obama (accessed March I". 2017). 
38 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
improve its human rights also pressure the United States to take necessary 
actions. According to Dave Boyer's report from The Washington Times: 
"The president reiterated America's unwavering support for 
upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms in China," the 
White House said in a statement about the meeting, which took place 
Thursday afternoon on the sidelines of a nuclear security summit in 
Washington. Administration critics had been urging Mr. Obama to get 
tougher with China on human rights. Rep. Chris Smith, New Jersey 
Republican and a leading voice on Capitol Hill on human rights issues, 
said this week that Mr. Obama has failed to usc either the power oft he 
presidency or his status as the 2009 Nobel honor to push back against 
the communist Chinese regime, which holds some 1 ,500 political 
prisoners."120 
Without a doubt, these signals would push a stronger anti-US sentiment 
from Beijing. 
Lastly, security issues such as territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea and the East China Sea has led the United States to pressure PRC 
during and after Obama's administration. The South China Sea disputes 
involve several sovereign states within the region, including Brunei, PRC, 
ROC, Malaysia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Republic of the 
Philippines, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, while the East China 
Sea disputes involve PRC, ROC, Japan, and South Korea. Obama had 
expressed concerns and warnings toward PRC regarding its maritime 
strategy that may generate regional instability in East and Southeast Asia 
several times during his administration. 121 More importantly, PRC has 
raised concerns and critiques over Obama's defense strategy in East Asia, 
as well as the continuation of arms sales to ROC on Taiwan. Perhaps this 
various security concerns can be summarized by the Chinese Ministry of 
Defense spokesman GENG Yansheng's speech to the new US defense 
plan: 
"We hope that the United States will flow with the tide of the era, and 
deal with China and the Chinese military in an objective and rational 
way, will be careful in its words and actions, and do more that is 
120. Dave Boyer, "Obama Raises !Iuman Rights, Cyberattacks with Chinese President," The 
Washington Post (April I". 2016 ), http://www. washingtontimes.cominews/20 16/apr/1/obama-
raiscs-human-rights-cyber-attacks-xi-jinpingl (accessed March 1", 2017). 
121. For example, sec "G20: Obama Wams Beijing against South China Sea Aggression," 
'flu: Gucmlicm (September 3'd, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/worh.l!2016/sep/03/g20-
obanm-warns-beijing-against-south-china-sca-;tggression (accessed March 2"". 20 17); and 
"Obama Forced Xi to B;tck Down over South China Sea Dispute," Financial Time.~ (July l21h, 
2016), https://www.ft.comlcontent/c63264a4-t7fl-ll e6-Rd6H-72c92lle86ab (accessed March 
2"'1• 20 17). 
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beneficial to the development of relations between the two countries 
and their militaries.''122 
While the US-China relations might start with a positive future, 
various unavoidable confrontations and challenges have pushed the 
relationship in the opposite direction during Obama 's administration. The 
case of ANZTEC shows support for Proposition2, in which the likelihood 
of establishing a free trade agreement between ROC and the nation, which 
maintains balanced foreign relations with PRC and the United States, is 
high when the US-China relations arc worsened. With the evidence 
provided above, US-China relations arc clearly challenged and worsened 
during the time when ANZTEC was under negotiation and finally 
approved with the signing and ratification. Demands from New Zealand 
to increase its economic cooperation with ROC, of course, is one of the 
conditions of tacilitating the realization of ANZTEC. But without the 
conflicting US-China relations, New Zealand would have had to take its 
relations with PRC and the United States into consideration before making 
this move. 
In particular, such US-China relations left plenty of room for New 
Zealand and ROC to engage in a series of semi-diplomatic interactions, 
without raising concerns from both PRC and the United States, as there 
were bigger and more critical issues for PRC and the United States to 
consider at the time. Moreover, New Zealand's benign but neutral 
relations with PRC and the United States further nurtured the likelihood 
of this bilateral trade agreement because this action would not be 
considered as a change of the balance between the United States and PRC. 
As the result, the maturation of ANZTEC was due to various factors, and 
it is strongly aligned with the prediction of our models. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Finding international space for ROC on Taiwan has been a long 
challenge after the UN Resolution 2758 because most of the nation states 
do not hold formal diplomatic relations with ROC. With the absence of 
diplomatic relations, it is nonetheless difficult for ROC to initiate 
negotiations and interactions with other countries, since ROC should not 
be treated and recognized as a sovereign state. On the top of sovereignty 
and recognition, pressures from PRC also has served as one of the most 
critical factors deterring any international interactions with ROC. 
122. MJ lee, "China Fires at New U.S. Defense Plan," J>OI./11CO (January 1", 2012), 
hnp://www.politico.com/story/20 1210 I /china-fires·at-new-us-defense-plan-071233 (accessed 
March P', 2017). 
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However, ROC also needs to fight for further development to gain 
domestic legitimacy and improve the welfare of its citizens. Thus, we 
question how ROC can establish a bilateral trade agreement without 
formal diplomatic relations with other states. Bilateral trade agreements 
arc important venues in the current globalized international economy, 
where lower tariffs and associated regulations encourage trade and 
investment across different states. We provide an extensive review of the 
literature regarding the pros and cons of trade liberalization. Borrowing 
from the concept of spatial modeling with the assumption ofthe zero-sum 
game within the US-China relations, we then developed four theoretical 
models and derived five propositions from these models. The model 
predicts that the likelihood of establishing a bilateral trade agreement is 
higher when (I) the US-China relations are worsened, (2) when the ROC-
PRC relations are improved and the potential country that shows interests 
in establishing a bilateral trade agreement with ROC also holds benign 
relations with PRC, and (3) when the US-ROC relations are improved and 
the potential country that shows interests in establishing a bilateral trade 
agreement with ROC also holds benign relations with the United States. 
To examine the validity of our theory, we analyze the only two bilateral 
trade agreements with nations that do not have diplomatic relations with 
ROC, the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs 
Territory ofTaiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership 
(ASTEP) and the Economic Cooperation Agreement between New 
Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, 
and Matsu (ANZTEC), and find support for two of our propositions: 
ASTEP was established due to benign relations between the triangular, 
PRC, ROC, and Singapore, and ANZTEC was materialized because the 
US-China relations were worsened under that international environment. 
This research also yields some limitations. First, with the current 
available cases, we can only find support for two of the five propositions 
we proposed and we cannot predict whether other propositions will ever 
be evident. Second, similar to the first limitation, with limited available 
cases, we can only find evidence in support of two propositions without 
repetition. There are chances to refute our supportive propositions with 
new evidence in the future. Third, our theory provides a simplification of 
the realpolitik, and the real diplomatic interactions may involve more 
considerations and factors we did not incorporate in our research. Lastly, 
our theory may not be generalizable to other states, as ROC on Taiwan is 
a peculiar existence in both the history and the current international world. 
These limitations do not dispute the validity of our theory, but do raise 
caution for readers who intend to extend and generalize our research. 
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The implications of this research is threefold. First, we provide 
theoretical foundations for ROC government to determine which state to 
approach for a potential bilateral trade agreement. Diplomatic personnel 
and government agency need to consider various factors including the 
current state of the US-China relation and the relationship between the 
potential country with PRC and the United States together. More 
importantly, with limited resources in hand, our research helps ROC 
government to distribute its resources with a higher efliciency and to direct 
the New Southbound Policy. Second, we also provide guidelines for any 
nations, which have interests in improving its trade and other economic 
interactions with ROC. In particular, we address the timing and factors that 
will affect the possibility of a bilateral trade agreement for those nations 
to take into account. Lastly, we also provide insights to international 
observers who have paid tremendous amount of attention to ROC on 
Taiwan, cross-strait issues and the triangular relations between ROC, 
PRC, and the United States. The triangular interactions are historically, 
politically, and internationally complicated, and our research warrants a 
relatively simple angle in viewing these interactions. 
We also aim to contribute to the literature of trade liberalization and 
international relations in general. As shown in the literature review 
section, most existing research focuses on the consequences of bilateral or 
multilateral trade agreements but not on the formation and realization of 
these agreements. ROC on Taiwan stands as an international puzzle in 
which its survival depends largely on the dynamics between the US-China 
relations. Nevertheless, ROC on Taiwan, as a vibrant state hosting over 23 
million population within about 14 thousand square miles (36 thousand 
square kilometers), has urged to break its diplomatic deadlocks imposed 
by PRC and to increase its international recognition for a better future. 
Sadly, ROC's diplomatic strategies unavoidably have to face the 
challenges and pressures from Beijing but this does not mean that ROC on 
Taiwan will not be able to gauge potential economic allies in the current 
world system. 
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